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Note
Tempest in the Laboratory: Medical Research on
Spare Embryos from In Vitro Fertilization
With the birth of Louise Brown on July 25, 1978, the first baby con-
ceived outside of the mother's body, or "in vitro," was born. 1 Although
many other in vitro births have now been confirmed around the world,
the practice of in vitro fertilization ("IVF") has created a host of legal
and ethical issues.2 One significant issue pertains to the use of the "spare
embryo." The spare embryo, created during the IVF process and la-
belled "spare" because it is never transferred to the uterus for further
development, has the potential to be extremely valuable as the subject of
medical research. It could be used to help combat infertility, perfect IVF
procedures, minimize risks of abnormalities, and test the effects of toxic
substances or new drugs on early fetal development. Spare embryos also
may aid cancer research because biologists have theorized that uncon-
trolled growth of cancer cells actually may be repressed embryonic genes,
which, for some reason, have been stimulated to carcinogenic behavior.3
Theoretically, research also could create a superhuman through genetic
manipulation of desirable characteristics. In fact, an entirely new breed
of creature, a hybrid, potentially could be created through interspecies
fertilization.
The possibilities presented by the spare embryo have sparked much
debate. Should we allow it to perish or destroy it after establishing a
1. "In vitro" translates literally as "in glass." It refers to all embryonic development
outside the uterus in the laboratory. Prior to Louise Brown's birth, there were previous un-
documented reports of births of in vitro babies. See Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code:
Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEo. L.J. 697, 708-09 (1976) (quoting Rorvik, The Embryo
Sweepstakes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1974, (Magazine), at 17 (Dr. Bevis of Leeds University
reported three successful implants of human embryos that had been produced by in vitro fertil-
ization, resulting in the births of three children. However, the scientific community viewed
Bevis' work with skepticism because he refused to document his research fully.)).
2. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised
by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEo. L.J. 1295 (1979); Scott, Test-Tube Babies, Experimental
Medicine and Allied Problems, 58 AUSTL. L.J. 405 (1984); Skene, Moral and Legal Issues in
the New Biotechnology, 59 AuSTL. L.J. 379 (1985); Steinfels, In Vitro Fertilization: Ethically
Acceptable Research, HASTINGS CENTER. REP., June 1979, at 5; Tiefel, Human In Vitro
Fertilization, A Conservative View, 247 J. A.M.A. 3235 (1982).
3. Human Embryo Transfer: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Over-
sight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1984) (state-
ment of G. Hodgen, Ph.D.) [hereinafter cited as Human Embryo Transfer Hearings].
[977]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
pregnancy? Alternatively, should we avoid creating it in the first place
by producing only the number of embryos intended for implantation,
freeze the embryo for future fertilization, or use it for therapeutic or non-
therapeutic research?4 These possibilities, once only imagined, have now
become realities.5 Legislation governing uses of the spare embryo, how-
ever, has not kept pace with science.
At the heart of these issues is the unresolved legal and moral status
of the embryo. Views regarding the moral status of the embryo cover a
wide spectrum.6 At one extreme is the belief held, for example, by the
Catholic Church that human life begins at the moment of conception.
Consequently, the spare embryo should be entitled to the respect, status,
and rights afforded a human being. According to this belief, any research
performed on the spare embryo is offensive and unacceptable. At the
other end of the spectrum is the belief that an embryo cannot be defined
as a person until it reaches a certain developmental stage. The Jewish
faith, for example, believes a fetus does not become a person until live
birth, or even beyond. Under this belief, nontherapeutic research may be
easier to justify morally.
The legal status of the embryo is largely undefined. In certain nar-
rowly drawn situations, the law provides protections to the fetus. 7 These
legal protections, however, are generally contingent on live birth or via-
bility.8 Regulation of the use of spare embryos is minimal. Only one
state has legislation that prohibits spare embryo research, and one state
has legislation pending that specifically covers spare embryo research.
The remaining states have no regulation at all. While some states have
statutes that regulate fetal experimentation, it is unclear whether they
control research on spare embryos. 9
Other countries have proposed various regulations pertaining to
spare embryos. These proposals include prohibition of the production of
spare embryos, 10 which necessarily prohibits medical research, and re-
4. Therapeutic research is medical treatment that utilizes new medical knowledge for
the direct purpose of benefiting the subject. Nontherapeutic research refers to procedures
designed to benefit patients, or a class of patients generally, rather than the particular subject
of the experiment. An example of nontherapeutic research is the testing of new drugs, not yet
proved safe or effective, on healthy subjects. Scott, supra note 2, at 413.
5. See Brahams, Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 2 LANCET
238, 239 (1984); Downing, Mohr, Trouson, Freeman, & Wood, Birth After Transfer of Cry-
opreserved Embryos, 142 MED. J. AUSTL. 409, 409-11 (1985); Potential of Embryos, 10 J. MED.
ETHICS 217, 217-18 (1984).
6. See infra notes 52-69 & accompanying text.
7. On the distinction between "fetus" and "embryo," see infra note 70.
8. See infra notes 70-100 & accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 125-48 & accompanying text.
10. COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ARISING
FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED BY
[Vol. 37
view by an ethics board of all research proposals on an ad hoc basis.1
This Note proposes guidelines for use of spare embryos consistent
with the position that the human embryo, although not a person, should
be afforded some protection by the law. In particular, this proposal sets
a time limit of fourteen days beyond which a spare embryo should not be
allowed to develop and provides for review by specially established insti-
tutional boards of all potential research projects involving spare embryos.
The differing views on the moral and legal status of spare embryos, as
well as the potential benefits of future research, have been considered in
formulating these guidelines. This proposal necessarily represents a com-
promise position.
This Note first discusses the in vitro fertilization procedure, the crea-
tion of the spare embryo, and the types of research involving these em-
bryos that raise legal and ethical issues. 12 After discussing the
controversy surrounding the moral status of the embryo, 13 the Note re-
views the current legal status of the embryo.14 Next, the Note provides
an overview of the existing regulations that relate, at least potentially, to
research on spare embryos, including recommendations for regulation
made in Australia and the United Kingdom.' 5 Finally, the Note suggests
that the time is ripe for regulation of this sensitive area and proposes
guidelines for future legislation governing research on spare embryos. 16
In Vitro Fertilization: Creation and Use of the Spare Embryo
In normal reproduction, conception occurs when an ovum released
during ovulation is fertilized by sperm that has travelled through the
uterus to the fallopian tubes. 17 After the fertilized egg undergoes a
number of cell divisions, the tiny clump of cells, known as a blastocyst,
enters the uterus and implants itself in the uterine lining. This implan-
tation process normally begins six to ten days after the fertilization
of the egg' 8 and is usually complete by the thirteenth or fourteenth
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 71 (1984) (statement of dissent by Rev. Dr. F. Harman) [hereinafter
cited as WALLER COMMITrEE REPORT].
11. See infra text accompanying notes 157-59.
12. See infra notes 17-51 & accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 52-69 & accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 70-100 & accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 101-74 & accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 176-98 & accompanying text.
17. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 84-89 (15th ed. 1976).
18. L. KAss, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1985) ("[The fertilized eggs]
reach the blastocyst stage (i.e., age of about seven to eight days), the stage at which the early
embryo normally implants itself in the wall of the uterus."); OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY
297 (D. Danforth 4th ed. 1982) ("[O]n the fifth or sixth day the blastocyst arrives in the
[uterus] .... Some investigators believe that the fertilized ovum spends three to four days
within the uterine cavity [before implantation on the uterine wall].").
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day.19 Beginning at thirteen to fourteen days after fertilization, the germ
layers, including the primitive streak, begin to form. The germ layers
eventually give rise to the embryo proper, to be distinguished from extra-
embryonic tissue.20
Several factors can prevent conception and pregnancy. Fertility
problems can be the result of a blockage of the woman's fallopian tubes
by infection or disease,2 1 idiopathic infertility,22 or endometriosis. 23 In
each of these situations, IVF may be employed to achieve the desired
pregnancy. 24
As currently practiced, IVF generally involves the following steps. 2
5
First, the woman's ovaries are stimulated by fertility drugs to produce
several mature oocytes (eggs) for ovulation, rather than the one egg nor-
mally produced. The maturation process of the eggs is monitored
through ultrasound visualization of the ovaries and by frequent measure-
ment of the woman's hormone levels. When the eggs have matured prop-
erly, they are collected from the ovaries by a procedure called
laparoscopy. 26
Each egg is then placed in a dish containing a special culture me-
dium, and sperm is added to effect fertilization. 27 After fertilization oc-
19. J. LANGMAN, MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 42-45 (4th ed. 1981) (Implantation is com-
pleted when the lining of the uterus has healed over the embryo.).
20. McLaren, Research on Early Human Embryos from in-vitro Fertilization (IVF): The
Warnock Recommendations, 92 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY 305, 305 (1985). The
primitive streak is the first distinguishing characteristic of the blastocyst and is the origin of
the cells that ultimately form the central nervous system of the embryo. See infra notes 182-
86. The germ layers consist of the ectoderm, the endoderm, and the mesoderm. The entire
nervous system, as well as the epidermis and other organs and tissues, are derived from the
ectoderm. The other layers develop into the dermis, skeletal system, connective tissue, and
most skeletal and smooth muscle. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 17, at 96.
21. R. GLASS & R. ERICSSON, GETTING PREGNANT IN THE 1980s: NEW ADVANCES IN
INFERTILITY TREATMENT AND SEX PRESELECTION 3, 12-13 (1982).
22. "Idiopathic infertility" is the term used when the precise cause of infertility is un-
known. Zamboni, Meldrum & Buster, Extracorporeal Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in the
Treatment of Infertility, 144 W.J. MED. 195, 200 (1986).
23. "Endometriosis" is a condition in which tissue resembling endometrium, the inner
lining of the uterus, is found in abnormal locations, mainly the organs and surfaces of the
pelvic cavity. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, supra note 18, at 1004. Endometriosis is one of
the four most common causes of infertility. Zamboni, Meldrum & Buster, supra note 22, at
200.
24. R. GLASS & R. ERICSSON, supra note 21, at 93; J. LANGMAN, supra note 19, at 46.
25. For a more detailed description of the IVF process, see generally HUMAN IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER (D. Wolf& M. Quigley eds. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as IN VITRO FERTILIZATION].
26. France, In Vitro Fertilization: A Brave New World?, N.Z.L.J., July 1984, at 234.
Laparoscopy is a procedure in which a thin tube is inserted through the abdominal wall into
the pelvis to inspect the ovaries. The doctor can observe the outside of the ovary through fiber
optics in the tube and can remove the mature eggs, by vacuum, out of the ovary. OBSTETRICS
AND GYNECOLOGY, supra note 18, at 938, 1251-53.
27. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, supra note 25, at 285-87.
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curs, the conceptus 28 is transferred to another dish containing blood
serum and sustaining nutrients. 29 The fertilized egg then undergoes a
number of cell divisions creating a blastocyst. 30 At approximately the
four- to eight-cell stage, the physician transfers the blastocyst through
the cervix to the uterus of the female.31 If the transfer is successful, the
blastocyst will attach itself to the uterine wall and the embryo will de-
velop normally, as if a natural conception had occurred.
Many clinics that perform IVF 32 produce more embryos than are
actually necessary to complete the procedure. 33 This is done for purposes
of quality control: to monitor and maintain optimally the medium in
which the embryos are suspended34 and to allow the most normal look-
ing egg to be selected for implantation. 35 Additionally, the transfer of
more than one or two embryos significantly increases the chance of suc-
cessful implantation.36 Generally, out of the five to ten embryos created
by IVF, only two to four are transferred to the patient's uterus. Thus,
several extra embryos, "spare embryos," usually remain after IVF is
completed. 37
The fate of these spare embryos has created much controversy. 38
Some clinics avoid the problem of the spare embryo by creating only the
28. The term "conceptus" is used to refer to the product of conception; here, it refers to
the product of any union of human sperm and human ova, whether occurring in vitro or in vivo
(in the woman's body). STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 308 (24th ed. 1982).
29. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, supra note 25, at 287-89.
30. See supra text accompanying note 18.
31. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, supra note 25, at 332-37.
32. The American Fertility Society in Birmingham, Alabama, provides the public with
current and reliable information concerning human reproduction. The Society's public educa-
tion wing provides referrals and publishes a list of clinics that perform IVF. The current list
contains the names, addresses, and phone numbers of over 100 clinics in the United States.
33. Telephone survey conducted by the author of 17 clinics from the IVF clinic list,
American Fertility Society Report (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal) (The clinics
surveyed were from several states, including Wisconsin, California, Alabama, Washington,
and Virginia.) [hereinafter cited as Telephone Survey]; see also McLaren, supra note 20, at 307
(Apr. 1985); Skene, supra note 2, at 384-85.
34. France, supra note 26, at 235.
35. Grobstein, The Moral Uses of "Spare" Embryos, HASTINGS CENTER REP, June 1982,
at 5, 5.
36. Zamboni, Meldrnm & Buster, supra note 22, at 201.
37. See generally IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, supra note 25.
38. See, eg., Hume, The Ethics of Experiments on Human Embryos, 14 ORIGINS 146, 146-
47 (1984) (recognizing the importance of research on spare embryos for solving problems of
infertility and inherited disorders, but arguing that freedom to experiment on and then destroy
human embryos can never be morally justified); Tiefel, supra note 2, at 3240-42 (arguing for
the inclusion of embryos created by IVF within the category of protectable humanity, making
all nontherapeutic research unjustifiable); see also Opinion, Embryos Untouched, 313 NATURE
612, 612 (1984) (condoning research on spare embryos and denying that a fertilized ovum is a
human being).
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number intended to be reimplanted. 39 Many other clinics simply discard
the embryos after successful implantation. 4° Still other clinics freeze the
spare embryos for a later attempt at pregnancy in the event the first at-
tempt is unsuccessful. 41 With consent of the donor, the embryo can also
be donated to an infertile couple or woman. 42 Another option, and the
main focus of this Note, is to use spare embryos for research purposes.43
Spare embryo research takes on a variety of forms. Most of the cur-
rent research is concerned with the alleviation of infertility, including
improvements in the IVF process itself.44 One example of ongoing infer-
tility research involves the study of the production by the conceptus of
human chorionic gonadotrophin, a hormone thought to be crucial for
successful implantation.45 Men with fertility problems are also being
tested to determine whether there is a correlation between the particular
type of sperm problem and its fertilizing capacity.46 Another research
project involving embryo tissue reportedly funded by the United States
Science Foundation in 1983 involved the development of a biochip that
could restore sight to the blind. The study investigated the use of "em-
bryonic nerve cells as a bridge to link the visual cortex of blind people to
a biochip implanted behind their eyes." 47
In addition to the advancement of infertility therapy and other re-
search projects using embryo tissue, research on the human conceptus
could contribute to the prevention of genetic defects. As one commenta-
tor has written:
[I]f a few cells could be removed from the pre-implantation conceptus
and cultured, it might be possible to apply chromosomal (e.g. for
Down's Syndrome) or molecular (e.g. for thalassaemia) diagnostic
methods to check whether the conceptus was affected. If it proved nor-
mal, the rest of the conceptus could then be recovered from storage
and replaced in the woman .... [T]his method would avoid having to
terminate an affected pregnancy; but it will require a considerable
amount of research to show that the conceptus is not compromised by
taking an embryonic biopsy, and that the diagnostic procedures are
39. Telephone Survey, supra note 33.
40. Id.; see also France, supra note 26, at 235.
41. Telephone Survey, supra note 33.
42. Id.
43. France, supra note 26, at 235.
44. McLaren, supra note 20, at 305.
45. Id. at 305-06. The research initially involved a determination that the blastocyst itself
secreted human chorionic gonadotrophin ("hCG"). "Culture conditions that ensure adequate
hCG production early in development should increase the IVF pregnancy rate. An under-
standing of why hCG secretion sometimes fails may also throw light on the high rate of im-
plantation failure in fertile cycles." Id. at 306.
46. Id. at 306. This type of testing often results in the production of spare embryos,
which then can be used as research subjects.
47. HUMAN EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION BILL, SENATE 1395, 1397 (Apr. 23, 1985)
(Second Reading Speech by Senator Harradine) (Austl.).
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feasible.48
Some of the possibilities for research on spare embryos are far more
Mengelean and imaginative than the infertility and IVF research dis-
cussed above. For example, an Australian IVF pioneer has suggested
that embryos could be grown in the laboratory until nervous tissue
formed; this tissue may then be suitable for transplants into adults suffer-
ing from various forms of nervous disorders.49 Leading IVF physicians
also have raised the possibility of implanting human embryos in animals
to study early development. These experiments would be aimed at im-
proving artificial fertilization techniques and reducing incidents of abnor-
malities.50 It also has been suggested that human embryos could be
grown in laboratories specifically to provide material for organ trans-
plants. Certain cells could be isolated and removed and could then be
grown as individual organs, which could be used to renovate parts of the
body as they deteriorate.5 1
These various possibilities for research on spare embryos, some of
them quite controversial, generate considerable scientific interest and
promise significant medical advancement. Any use of the spare embryo
for research, however, is likely to create difficult legal and ethical
dilemmas.
Theories on Inception of Life
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of spare embryo research is the
uncertain moral status of the embryo. The theory a person embraces
regarding the point at which life begins will directly affect his or her
views on the propriety of research on spare embryos. Such theories span
a continuum that ranges from the belief that life begins at the moment of
conception,5 2 to the belief that life does not begin until live birth.53 For
those who adopt the former view, nontherapeutic research on spare em-
bryos amounts to experimentation with human life. In contrast, for
48. McLaren, supra note 20, at 306. A "biopsy" is the removal and examination of tissues
as an aid to medical diagnosis. An "embryonic biopsy" is a biopsy performed on embryonic
tissue. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 169 (26th ed. 1981).
49. HUMAN EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION BILL, supra note 47, at 1397.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also Human Embryo Transfer Hearings, supra note 3, at 58 (statement of G.
Hodgen) ("It may be possible to provide new healthy organs whose growth and differentiation
is supported by embryonic cells.").
52. In Vitro Fertilisation: Morality and Public Policy, Evidence Submitted to the Govern-
ment Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (The Warnock Com-
mittee) by the Catholic Bishops' Joint Committee on Bio-Ethical Issues on Behalf of the
Catholic Bishops of Great Britain, at 6 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Catholic Bishops' Joint
Committee]; see infra notes 54-59 & accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 65-69 & accompanying text.
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those who subscribe to the theory that life does not begin until live birth,
research on spare embryos may not raise similar moral issues.
Life Begins at Conception Theory
For those who believe that human life begins at conception, non-
therapeutic experimentation on a human embryo is fundamentally unac-
ceptable. 54 They regard the embryo as "actual" life, as opposed to
"potential" life, and believe that, although discussion in the terms of
"person" is unnecessary, the products of human conception can be none
other than "human." 55
This is the view of the Catholic Church. The Archbishop's Joint
Statement of January 1980 explains the Church's view:
[A]t the time of conception there comes into existence a new life. There
is a union in which a living cell from the father fertilizes a living cell
from the mother. That union, a transmission of life, is the beginning of
a new life .... Each such new life is the life not of a potential human
being but of a human being with potential. The development of this
potential is normally a process of profound continuity. No one can
point to, say, the fourth week of that process, or the eighth, the
twelfth, the twentieth, the twenty-fourth or twenty-eighth, and say,
"That is when I began being me."'56
The question for those sharing this belief is whether it is moral to
subject human beings to experimentation. 57 The Catholic Bishops' Joint
Committee on Bioethical Issues has specifically discussed research on
spare embryos. Predicated on the belief that life begins at conception,
the Committee concluded that any form of experimentation on a human
embryo, spare or otherwise, that is likely to damage or endanger that
embryo is "fundamentally unacceptable and ought to be prohibited by
any civilized community."' 58
Nevertheless, certain people who agree that life begins at conception
do not oppose experimentation on spare embryos. Such experimentation
is justified, in their view, by the necessity for research and also their belief
that, although life begins at conception, the embryo is accorded lesser
rights than the individual. 59
54. Catholic Bishops' Joint Committee, supra note 52, at 8.
55. See generally J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE
SEVENTIES (1979).
56. Catholic Bishops' Joint Committee, supra note 52, at 6.
57. See, e.g., Uddo, The Human Life Bill: Protecting the Unborn Through Congressional
Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 Loy. L. REV. 1079 (1981).
58. Catholic Bishops' Joint Committee, supra note 52, at 8.
59. An example of such a view is that held by Dr. Edwards, a member of the British team
that brought Louise Brown, the first in vitro baby, into the world. See supra text accompany-
ing note 1. In his account of the beginnings of life, Dr. Edwards writes that "the embryo is
passing through a critical period of life .... [I]t becomes magnificently organized, switching
on its own biochemistry, increasing in size, and preparing itself quickly for implantation into
[Vol. 37THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
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Multicellular Individual Theory
The multicellular individual theory held by some in the scientific
community suggests that, although genetic individuality is established at
fertilization, a multicellular individual is not present until approximately
the eight-cell stage. Until this point, the cells behave independently of
each other rather than as interdependent parts of a whole. Each cell is
capable of forming a complete embryo if isolated from the other cells. 60
As one commentator writes, "Since persons, as usually defined, are mul-
ticellular individuals, it is difficult to maintain scientifically that a person
has come into existence prior to the eight-cell stage."' 6 1 Under this view,
until a multicellular individual is discernible, the moral issues related to
experimentation on human life do not arise. Thus, certain types of re-
search would be acceptable under the multicellular individual theory.
Hominization Theory
The hominization theory is a Christian belief, which is based upon
the religious premise that the soul is the equivalent of the person. As
expressed by one writer:
[I]n theological parlance [the theory] is called animation, ensoulment
or hominization, that is, the "moment" when a conceptus- embryo-
fetus-neonate might be said to have a "soul" conferred upon it. For
those who might generally be reluctant to use the term "soul" or who
simply do not quite understand what this referent means, let "soul"
stand for the sine qua non of humanness-that which in this case
would make the conceptus or embryo or fetus or neonate a "thou"
rather than an "it".... [A] determination of the "moment" of anima-
tion resolves the question of human status and clarifies all of its ethical
and legal corollaries. 62
The moment of hominization can be placed anywhere in the gesta-
the womb." R. EDWARDS & P. STEPTOE, A MATTER OF LIFE, THE STORY OF A MEDICAL
BREAKTHROUGH 101 (1981). Even in this pre-implantation stage the embryo is "a micro-
scopic human being-one in its very earliest stages of development." Id. at 83. However, in
spite of this belief, Dr. Edwards denies that the embryo has the "full rights of the individual,"
id. at 104, and is in favor of research on spare embryos as both necessary and beneficial. See
Williams & Stevens, What Now for Test Tube Babies?, 93 NEW SCIENTIST 312 (1982). In
defending his research with spare embryos, Dr. Edwards said:
[They] can be very, very useful. They can teach us things about early human life
which will help that patient and other patients. It is very important to know that the
types and patterns of growth that we get in our cultures are normal-as normal as we
can ensure-and I believe it is absolutely essential to examine the speed of growth of
these embryos ... [and] to examine their chromosomes. . . because we want to
make sure that we're not getting conditions which would lead to anomalies ....
Id. at 314.
60. Grobstein, supra note 35, at 6.
61. Id.
62. Dennis, Introduction, Symposium on Life and Death: Issues and Implications, 27
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1069, 1076 (1982).
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tive sequence, from conception to the moment of birth.63 Those who
have accepted the theory of hominization would not find research on
spare embryos morally repugnant as long as the research took place prior
to the moment of ensoulment.64
Live Birth Theory
Many religions, including segments of the Jewish community and
large segments of the Protestant community, support the position that
life does not begin until live birth. Interpreters of Jewish law deem the
fetus to be "part of its mother rather than an independent entity."' 65
They would not recognize the fetus as a viable, living entity until thirty
days after its birth, "unless a full nine month pregnancy is definitely
known to have been completed .... [A] still unborn child, then, is cer-
tainly in the category of only doubtful viability."' 66 The Talmud "presup-
pose[s] that the fetus is not a person .... Only when it comes into the
world 'is it a person.' "67
The theory that life begins at live birth seems also to have been ac-
cepted by a segment of the scientific community. Historically, more sig-
nificance was given to "quickening" than to conception.68 This appears
to have changed: "Physicians and their scientific colleagues . . . have
tended to focus either upon conception, upon live birth, or upon the in-
terim point at which the fetus becomes 'viable,' that is, potentially able to
live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid."' 69
There is thus a wide divergence of views on the difficult question of
when life begins. How an individual answers this question will determine
his or her views on the acceptability of research on spare embryos. How
society answers this question will influence the development of the em-
bryo's status in the law.
63. When the moment of hominization is placed later in the gestative sequence, it is
called "delayed hominization." This term "refers to the.., principle that the human soul can
only inform matter sufficiently prepared for it .... [I]n order to be prepared ... the human
matter must be sufficiently differentiated into organs, including the cerebral cortex, the site of
the human animal's highest activity." Horan, Fetal Experimentation and Federal Regulation,
22 VILL. L. REV. 325, 331 n.33 (1977) (citing Donceel, Immediate Animation and Delayed
Hominization, 31 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 76, (1970)).
64. Horan, supra note 63, at 331.
65. D. FELDMAN, MARITAL RELATIONS, BIRTH CONTROL AND ABORTION IN JEWISH
LAW 253 (1974).
66. Id. at 254.
67. Id. at 255.
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 134-36 (1973). "Quickening" refers to the first motion of
the fetus felt by the mother, occurring usually about the middle of the term of pregnancy.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1122 (5th ed. 1979).
69. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
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The Legal Status of the Embryo
The legal status of the embryo is at best uncertain. Whether the
fetus70 has legal rights depends upon the legal context that gives rise to
the question. 71 Courts have side-stepped the critical issue of when life
begins because they do not feel qualified to determine it. Consequently,
they have emphasized the rights afforded the fetus in certain situations,
rather than the status of the fetus in terms of when it becomes a person,
which would determine its rights in all situations. Using this approach,
the courts need not find the fetus to be a person within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment72 in order to extend substantive legal protec-
tions to it. The following analysis describes the current legal status of the
fetus in general and the rights afforded to it in different areas of the law.
The Embryo as a "Person"
In Roe v. Wade,73 the United States Supreme Court, addressing a
woman's right to an abortion, expressly declined to decide the question
of when life begins. The Court stated:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this
point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer.74
The Court found no basis apart from certain religious beliefs or philoso-
phies upon which to consider whether a fetus is a person for purposes of
the fourteenth amendment.75 Because the Court found that the woman's
privacy interest, which included making the abortion decision, was "fun-
damental,"' 76 a state could not constitutionally proscribe abortion unless
it demonstrated an independent and compelling interest in the life of the
mother or the fetus.77 Only after the point of viability, considered to be
somewhere at the beginning of the third trimester, did the Court recog-
70. Technically, the terms "embryo" and "fetus" refer to different gestational stages in
the development of the unborn conceptus, the embryo being an earlier stage that lasts until the
end of the eighth week. The law does not distinguish on this basis, however, and uses the term
"fetus" to refer to all stages of development. Instead, the law differentiates at the point of
viability and live birth. For semantic simplicity, the term "fetus" in this section of the Note is
used as defined by the law rather than by the medical profession.
71. Doudera, Fetal Rights? It Depends, 18 TRIAL, Apr. 1982, at 38, 39.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides that "[no state
shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74. Id. at 159.
75. Id. at 158 ("[We are] persuade[d] that the word 'person' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment does not include the unborn.").
76. Id. at 152-53.
77. Id. at 155-56.
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nize that the states had a compelling interest in protecting the life of the
fetus.78 "At this point the fetus could have 'meaningful life' outside the
mother and the state could demonstrate an important interest in its exist-
ence apart from moral philosophy concerning the beginning of life." 79
Property Law
The Anglo-American courts first afforded legal rights to the unborn
in the area of property law. Blackstone in fact stated:
An infant en ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in
law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a
surrender of a copyhold estate, made to it. It may have a guardian
assigned to it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and
to take afterwards by such limitation as if it were then actually born. 80
Inheritance rights of the unborn continue to be recognized today.8'
Although these rights generally attach at conception, live birth is essen-
tial in order for them to be perfected. 2
Tort Law
Although the fetus has been afforded more protections for prenatal
injuries over the years, recovery generally is permitted only if the fetus is
viable, or at least "quick,1 83 at the time of the injury.84 For example,
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton85 is a very early case in which
recovery was sought for the death of a fetus caused by injuries sustained
in utero. The court in that case denied recovery to the fetus, holding that
it was not a person within the meaning of the Massachusetts wrongful
death statute because it was part of the mother at the time of the injury.
The court found the fetus had no independent existence and, therefore,
78. Id. at 160.
79. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & D. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 746 (2d ed. 1983).
80. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "130.
81. See, e.g., Estate of Kurtz, 190 Cal. 146, 210 P. 959 (1922) (recognizing that an
afterborn child is deemed to be an existing person for purposes of inheriting its father's estate);
see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 698 (West 1982) (posthumous children are entitled to take in same
manner as if living at parents' death, when a future interest is limited to successors, heirs,
issue, or children); id. § 739 (a future interest contingent on the death of a person without
heirs, successors, or children is defeated by the birth of a posthumous child of such person,
capable of taking by succession).
82. Shaw & Damme, Legal Status of The Fetus, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 3, 4 (A.
Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1975); Doudera, supra note 71, at 39.
83. See supra note 68.
84. Doudera, supra note 71, at 42; Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and the Embryo Transfer:
Fertile Areas for Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973, 997-98 & nn. 196-97 (1982) (Most cases that have
recognized a cause of action for wrongful death of the fetus have done so when the fetus was
viable, or at least quick.); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62 (1973).
85. 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (A woman, four to five months pregnant, slipped on a defective
highway and fell, causing her to miscarry; the fetus was too young to survive on its own.).
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the mother was the only one injured by the tort. 86 Today, however,
courts generally allow a fetus to recover in a wrongful death or personal
injury action.87 In deciding whether to allow recovery, the courts often
focus on such factual criteria as whether the fetus was viable at the time
of the fatal injury, and whether the particular jurisdiction requires that
the fetus be born alive before dying in order to maintain an action. 88
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,89 however, explained these de-
velopments as a vindication of the parents' interest rather than as a rec-
ognition of legal rights in the unborn:
[S]ome States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an
action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. Such an action,
however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and
is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only
potentiality of life .... In short, the unborn have never been recog-
nized in the law as persons in the whole sense.90
Criminal Law
In the criminal law context, the issue of the fetus' status as a person
has been considered in both abortion situations and in situations in which
an assault on a pregnant woman results in death to the fetus. The status
of the fetus, rather than its legal rights, is more important in this context,
as status will determine whether a homicide has been committed. 91
At common law, causing the death of a fetus that had "quickened" 92
was a misdemeanor rather than a homicide.93 Criminal law did not pro-
86. Id. at 17.
87. See, e.g., Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962) (allowing a
cause of action when a child was stillborn through the negligence of the defendant); Shousha v.
Matthews Drivurself Serv., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W. 2d 471 (1962) (allowing a cause of action
to a child later born alive); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, 1228 (1971).
88. See, e.g., Shirley v. Bacon, 154 Ga. App. 203, 267 S.E.2d 809 (1980) (An action for
wrongful death of an unborn child may be maintained if the child was quick at its death,
although it was not quick at the time of the injury.); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d
368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973) (An action could be maintained under the Illinois Wrongful Death
Act for the death of a viable fetus resulting from injuries negligently inflicted while the fetus
was in utero.); Leccese v. McDonough, 361 Mass. 64, 279 N.E.2d 339 (1972) (A fetus born
alive becomes a "person," with at least a theoretical possibility of survival and of enduring
consequences of prenatal injury, while a fetus not born alive incurs no such risk of continuing
injury and is not a "person" within the meaning of the wrongful death statute.); State ex rel
Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976) (Until there has been a live birth, a fetus is not a
"person" within the meaning of the Missouri Wrongful Death Act and therefore cannot main-
tain a cause of action pursuant to that statute.); see also Lorio, supra note 84, at 997-98.
89. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
90. Id. at 162 (citation omitted).
91. The common law defined homicide as the killing of one human being by another. 40
AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 1 (1968).
92. See supra note 68.
93. Annot., 40 A.L.R.3D 444, 446 (1971).
May 1986] NOTE
tect the fetus that had not "quickened." 94 If the child was born alive and
subsequently died due to the assault or abortion, the crime was consid-
ered to be homicide.9 5
California initially followed this common-law rule requiring a child
to be born alive in order for it to be the victim of a homicide. In Keeler v.
Superior Court,96 the California Supreme Court held that an unborn fetus
was not a human being within the meaning of the California homicide
statute, which stated that "murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought. ' 97 The California homicide statute sub-
sequently was amended 98 and now protects the fetus "by creating a new
category of murder victim rather than by redefining the term 'human
being' to include a fetus." 99 Thus, although at common law a fetus could
not be the victim of a homicide unless it was born alive, today, by statute
in California and in other jurisdictions, it can. 100
In summary, the legal status of the fetus is uncertain. Although it
has been afforded some protections by law, the fetus has never been held
to be a person within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Fetal
rights that have been recognized tend to be narrowly defined and limited
to circumstances such as inheritance and personal injury. Furthermore,
fetal rights are generally contingent upon live birth or viability. Conse-
quently, regulations that control experimentation on fetuses and spare
embryos tend to offer less protection than they would if the fetus were
considered a person.
Regulations Relating to Research on Spare Embryos
There are no federal statutes, and only one state statute, that specifi-
cally concern the spare embryo. In the United States and abroad, how-
ever, guidelines for such laws have been proposed. This section of the
94. Id.; see also Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsis-
tencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349, 362-63 (1971).
95. Note, supra note 94, at 362-63.
96. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970) (Defendant repeatedly kneed
his former wife, eight months pregnant by another man, in the stomach; the fetus died in utero
as a result of the defendant's assault.).
97. Id. at 628, 470 P.2d at 622, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 187
(West 1970)).
98. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1986). The statute was amended in 1970 fol-
lowing the Keeler decision.
99. Doudera, supra note 71, at 41.
100. Many states require the fetus to be past a certain developmental stage. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West Supp. 1985) (an unborn quick child); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7
(West Supp. 1985) (after the end of the second trimester); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.210, .220
(1967); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 125.00 (McKinney 1986) (unborn child of more than twenty-four
weeks). For a more complete treatment of the unborn in the criminal law, see generally Note,
supra note 94, at 362-69; Annot., 40 A.L.R.3D 444 (1971).
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Note discusses the American Fertility Society's °1 guidelines and the ex-
isting federal and state regulations concerning potentially related proce-
dures, which may, in the future, be interpreted to apply to research on
spare embryos. It then will consider the recommendations of committees
officially appointed in Australia and Great Britain to study regulation of
medical research on spare embryos. Finally, it will discuss specific at-
tempts at regulation made in the United States.
The American Fertility Society
The American Fertility Society has proposed guidelines in the form
of an ethical statement that stresses consent of the donor before the em-
bryos may be used for research.10 2 These guidelines are followed volunta-
rily by many IVF clinics.10 3
The ethical statement calls for a blanket consent form, signed by the
participating couple, that covers all the various steps in the IVF proce-
dure. It further provides:
[The] concepti are the property of the donors. The donors therefore
have the right to decide at their sole discretion the disposition of these
items, provided such disposition is within the medical and ethical
guidelines as outlined herein ....
It is considered ethically acceptable to scientifically examine any
conceptus donated for this purpose, provided such examination is car-
ried out prior to the time development has reached the stage when
implantation would normally occur. For purposes of this paragraph, 14
days after insemination is considered to be the limit. Non-transferred
concepti should not be allowed to develop in the laboratory more than
14 days .... 104
The idea of requiring consent for therapeutic and nontherapeutic
research developed as a consequence of the Nuremberg Code of 1947.105
This Code was promulgated as a response to the revelations of Nazi
atrocities involving human medical experimentation in concentration
camps.106
101. American Fertility Society, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 12 (1984). The American Fertility Society is an organization of more than 9200
doctors, scientists, and allied health professionals. The primary objective of the Society is to
provide the public with the latest scientific knowledge on all aspects of reproductive health,
with emphasis on current research and medical procedures.
102. Id.
103. Telephone Survey, supra note 33.
104. American Fertility Society, Minimum Standards for IVF Programs, 41 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 13 (1984).
105. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949).
106. The first rule of the Code emphasized the necessity for voluntary consent. Id. at 181.
Other rules prescribed conditions that should apply to all experimentation and included mini-
mization of risk, right of the subject to discontinue participation, a humanitarian justification
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It should be noted that the consent required by the Society's guide-
lines is that of the donor, rather than a substituted consent on behalf of
the embryo. The informed consent doctrine is intended to foster rational
decision-making and to avoid fraud or duress. The objectives of the doc-
trine in the medical research context also include promotion of individ-
ual autonomy and protection of the patient-subject's status as a human
being. 10 7 Indeed, legal capacity to consent is determined by the subject's
status rather than his ability to make an intelligent decision. 108 Since the
embryo's legal status is uncertainI 09-and its ability to make decisions
beyond question- the traditional informed consent objectives do not ap-
ply in this context. The Society's consent requirement thus seems to
protect a property interest of the donor in the embryo. The fourteen day
limitation on research after fertilization, however, affords some protec-
tion to the embryo after it reaches the generally recognized point at
which implantation would normally be complete.1 10
Federal Regulation of Potentially Related Procedures
Although no federal statutes deal directly with the subject of re-
search on spare embryos, some federal administrative regulations do pro-
vide guidelines for analogous procedures that are federally funded, such
as fetal and in vitro research."' 1 In 1975, the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (now Health and Human Services, or "HHS") promul-
gated rules and regulations pertaining to research, development, and
related activities involving fetuses and human in vitro fertilization in its
basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Subjects. 112 By its own defini-
tion, however, HHS has excluded the spare embryo from the class of
"fetuses" afforded protection by this chapter. "Fetus" is defined by the
regulations as "the product of conception from the time of implantation
(as evidenced by any of the presumptive signs of pregnancy ... ), until a
determination is made, following expulsion or extraction of the fetus,
for undertaking the experiment, and the elimination of any chance of death or injury caused by
the experiment. Id. at 182.
107. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 340, 364-69 (1974-75).
108. Silva, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation: The Scientist's Responsibility-
The Subject's Right, TRIAL, Dec. 1980, at 37, 38.
109. See supra notes 70-100 & accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 17-20 & accompanying text.
111. The House Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight held hearings to consider
how a consensus on the sensitive issues raised by the new reproductive technologies might be
developed. The hearings focused on the legal and ethical aspects of IVF, lavage, and cry-
opreservation. Although some of the witnesses addressed the problem of research on spare
embryos, no action has been taken on the findings of these hearings. Human Embryo Trans-
fer: Hearings, supra note 3, at 2.
112. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.211 (1985).
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that it is viable."' 13 The regulations contain no provision that could be
considered a legal or ethical statement on the issues raised by experimen-
tal research on spare embryos.
HHS justified its decision not to regulate research on products of
IVF by stating that at that time "biomedical research [was] not yet near
the point of being able to maintain for a substantial period the non-im-
planted product of in vitro fertilization." ' 14 Given the state of research,
HHS believed regulations would be premature, although it anticipated
such regulation in the future when the state of biomedical science war-
ranted it.115
The federal regulations that govern research involving fetuses and
IVF require that all proposals for such research be reviewed by locally
established Institutional Review Boards ("IRBs"). 116 After approval by
the IRB, the Secretary of HHS may either grant funding, reject the pro-
posal, or request an additional review by an Ethics Advisory Board
("EAB"). 17 The function of the EAB is to give advice concerning the
ethical issues presented by the proposals submitted to it."11
Following the promulgation of the 1975 regulations, HHS chartered
an EAB to review the proper federal role in funding of IVF research.
The EAB published its report in 1979.119 One section of the report ad-
dressed research involving human in vitro fertilization without subse-
quent embryo transfer ("ET"), finding it ethically acceptable if certain
conditions were satisfied. The applicable conditions are as follows:
1. The research [must] compl[y] with all the appropriate... regula-
tions governing research with human subjects... ;
2. The research [must be] designed primarily: (A) to establish the
safety and efficacy of embryo transfer, and (B) to obtain important sci-
entific information toward that end not reasonably attainable by other
means;
3.[Donors must be fully] informed of the nature and purpose of the
research, in which such materials will be used and have specifically
consented to such use;
4. No embryos [may] be sustained in vitro beyond the stage normally
associated with the completion of implantation 14 days after
113. Id. § 46.203(c) (emphasis added).
114. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,527 (1975).
115. Id.
116. Id. Federal law requires all institutions receiving federal funds for research to estab-
lish an IRB to review biomedical research involving human subjects. National Research Ser-
vice Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348 § 212, 88 Stat. 342, 349-53 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2896 (1982)).
117. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(c) (1985); see also Wilson, Fetal Experimentation: Legal Implica-
tions of an Ethical Conundrum, 53 DEN. L.J. 581, 633-34 (1976).
118. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(b) (1985).
119. ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, REPORT
AND CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILI-
ZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER (1979).
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fertilization. 120
The Board specifically made no judgment or recommendations re-
garding the ethical acceptability of human embryo research unrelated to
the safety and efficacy of IVF and ET procedures. 121 It anticipated, but
did not decide, the issue of producing embryos for the purpose of re-
search. No action has ever been taken with respect to the EAB
recommendations. 122
The 1975 regulations promulgated by the HHS only apply to re-
search conducted or funded by a federal governmental agency and do
not preempt any applicable state laws. 123 Therefore, the EAB and IRB
review requirements constitute a funding restriction. 124
State Regulation of Potentially Related Procedures
Many states have passed statutes that regulate fetal experimenta-
tion. 125 The statutes generally are designed to control research on
aborted fetuses and it is unclear in most cases whether the spare embryo
qualifies for protection. 126 The statutes vary considerably from state to
state, particularly in the amount of protection afforded to the fetus. At
one extreme, some states prohibit all experimentation that is nonthera-
peutic to the subject of the research. 127 Arizona, for example, has one of
the strictest statutes:
A person shall not knowingly use any fetus or embryo, living or dead,
or any parts, organs or fluids of any such fetus or embryo resulting
from an induced abortion. . . for any... experimentation... except
as is strictly necessary to diagnose a disease or condition in the mother
120. Id. at 106-07.
121. Id. at 111.
122. Letter to author from Charles R. McCarthy, Director, Office for Protection from
Research Risks, National Institute of Health (Dec. 27, 1985) (copy on file with The Hastings
Law Journal).
123. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101, .201(b) (1985).
124. Id. §§ 46.204(c)-.205(b).
125. For a complete discussion and analysis of the various state fetal research statutes, see
Baron, Fetal Research: The Question in the States, HASTINGS CENTER. REP., Apr. 1985, at
12; see also Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies, 70
A.B.A. J. 50, 50-51 (1984).
126. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302A (West Supp. 1985) (fetus or embryo
resulting from an induced abortion); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956(a) (West 1984)
(any aborted product of human conception, other than fetal remains); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
40:1299.35.13 (West 1985) (unborn child or child born as the result of an abortion); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Page 1982) (product of human conception that is aborted); Lo-
rio, supra note 84, at 986.
127. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956(a) (West 1984) ("unlawful... to use any
aborted product of human conception . . .[for research] except to protect or preserve the life
and health of the fetus"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82)
("[N]o person shall use any fetus ... aborted alive for any type of ... research ... except as
necessary to protect or preserve the life and health of such premature infant aborted alive.").
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of the fetus or the embryo and only if the abortion was performed
because of such disease or condition. 128
At the other extreme, the more liberal states merely require maternal
consent before the fetus can be used as an experimental subject.129
The state statutes that are between these two extremes vary consid-
erably. Some regulate only research done in anticipation of, or subse-
quent to, an abortion. 130 Other states permit research on any nonliving
fetuses.13 ' And some ban research in a more general manner, for exam-
ple, by prohibiting nontherapeutic research on a "live human embryo,"
or on "any product of human conception."' 132 Thus, the state statutes
regulating fetal experimentation span a broad continuum. In most states,
however, it is unclear whether the products of IVF ex utero are
protected.
At least three states, Illinois, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania, have
passed laws that regulate specific aspects of IVF.I33 However, at this
time, only Minnesota has a statute that expressly prohibits research on
spare embryos. That statute defines "human conceptus" to include the
products of conception produced outside of the human body and pro-
vides that any nontherapeutic use of a living human conceptus consti-
tutes a gross misdemeanor.134 Illinois has pending legislation that
directly concerns experimentation on spare embryos. In 1985, a bill
amending the 1961 Illinois Criminal Code was introduced into the Illi-
nois State House. ' 35 This bill prohibits any person from selling or experi-
menting upon a fetus produced by fertilization outside the body of a
human female unless the experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus.136
Illinois also has a statute that has been interpreted by the state At-
torney General to prohibit experimentation on the nonimplanted prod-
ucts of IVF. The relevant provision reads:
Any person who intentionally causes the fertilization of a human ovum
by a human sperm outside the body of a living human female shall,
128. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302A (West Supp. 1985).
129. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-17 (1977) ("Experimentation with fetuses
without written consent of the woman shall be prohibited."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208
(1982) ("unlawful... to engage in... research upon an aborted fetus without the prior...
consent of the mother").
130. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-436 to 441 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.14 (Page 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208 (1982).
131. See, eg., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12(j) (West 1983) (consent of the mother
required); 1979 Neb. Laws LB 316 § 8.
132. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333. 2685-.2692 (West 1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.421-.422 (West Supp. 1985).
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(7) (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 145.421-.422 (West Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3213(e) (Purdon 1985).
134. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.421-.422 (West Supp. 1985).
135. This bill is presently being considered by the House Committee on the Judiciary.
ILL. H. B. 1054, 84th Gen. Ass. (1985).
136. Id.
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with regard to the human being thereby produced, be deemed to have
care and custody of a child for the purposes of Section 4 of the Act to
Prevent and Punish Wrongs to Children, . . . except that nothing in
that section shall be construed to attach any penalty to participation in
the performance of a lawful pregnancy termination. 137
In 1983, an action, which was subsequently dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, was brought challenging the constitutionality
of this provision on the ground that it was a prohibition against IVF. 38
The State's Attorney and Attorney General maintained that this provi-
sion did not prohibit IVF, but rather "protect[ed] the State's interest in
human life by prohibiting willful exposure of embryos to harm, [such] as
by destructive laboratory experimentation."'' 39 Although this is not a ju-
dicial pronouncement, the State's Attorney's and Attorney General's in-
terpretation makes it likely that embryo experimentation would at least
be prosecuted in Illinois.
A Pennsylvania statute, without expressly legitimizing nontherapeu-
tic research on human embryos, requires that anyone conducting experi-
mentation in IVF file quarterly information reports. 140 The implication
is that if proper records are kept and reports filed, nontherapeutic re-
search on human embryos will not otherwise violate the statute.
In the abortion context, certain state statutes have declared that life
begins at the moment of conception. If found to be constitutional, these
statutes would afford the fetus the right to life and would effectively pro-
hibit nontherapeutic research on human embryos. The Illinois Abortion
Act of 1975 states a long-standing state policy "that the unborn child is a
human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal person
for purposes of the unborn child's right to life and is entitled to the right
to life from conception under the laws and Constitution of [Illinois].' 14 1
If this policy became operative law, it would prohibit all nontherapeutic
research on spare embryos as well as nontherapeutic abortions. This sec-
tion of the Act, however, has been judicially declared to have no substan-
tive effect. 1
42
In 1973, a similar provision in a Rhode Island abortion statute was
declared unconstitutional. The statute stated that human life begins at
the moment of conception and that such a life is a "person" within the
137. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
138. Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157, 159 (N.D. 111. 1983).
139. Id. at 161.
140. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3213(e) (Purdon 1985). The quarterly reports must contain
names of all persons "conducting or assisting" the experimentation, locations where experi-
mentation is conducted, names of the sponsors of the experimentation, the number of eggs
fertilized, the number of fertilized eggs destroyed or discarded, and the number of women in
whom fertilized eggs are implanted. The statute also provides for a fine of $50 per day for any
violation.
141. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (Smith-Hurd 1977).
142. Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 143 Although promulgated to reg-
ulate abortion, if found to be constitutional, this law probably would
have prohibited all nontherapeutic research on spare embryos. In light
of the Roe v. Wade' 44 decision, however, the Rhode Island District
Court found the statute to be unconstitutional on its face. 145
In sum, there has been only minimal legal regulation of embryo re-
search in the United States. Federal regulations protect human subjects
only and impose no sanctions other than the threat of failing to qualify
for government funding for research projects. 146 Only Minnesota has a
statute that specifically prohibits research on spare embryos. 147 The
only other state law that specifically addresses research on spare embryos
is still pending in the Illinois House. 148 Several of the states' fetal re-
search statutes may be stretched to cover research on nonimplanted
human embryos, but it is not clear whether in all cases they will apply.
Recommendations of Foreign Committees
The United Kingdom and Australia have been pioneers in the IVF
field. Spurred by the considerable publicity surrounding IVF births, 149
each of these countries appointed official investigatory bodies to consider
the social, legal, and ethical issues arising from IVF. In addition to these
official bodies, other organizations began their own inquiries. 150 Both of
the official investigatory bodies concluded that such research was accept-
able provided that the embryo was not allowed to develop beyond the
stage of implantation, which is completed fourteen days after
fertilization.
Australia
In March 1982, the Attorney General and Minister of Health of
Victoria, Australia, established the nine-member, interdisciplinary Com-
mittee to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising from In
Vitro Fertilization. 15 1 This committee, chaired by Professor Waller, is
more commonly known as the Waller Committee. The Waller Commit-
tee's function was to consider whether IVF should be conducted in Vic-
toria and, if so, to determine the procedures and guidelines that should
143. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-3-1 to 11-3-5 (1981) (declared unconstitutional).
144. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see supra notes 73-79 & accompanying text.
145. Doe v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193, 1199 (R.I. 1973).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
147. See supra note 134.
148. See supra notes 135-36 & accompanying text.
149. Skene, supra note 2, at 385.
150. The conclusions of several of these organizations appear in the WALLER COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 10, at 40-45.
151. Skene, supra note 2, at 385.
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be implemented. 52 One of the Waller Committee's reports concerned
the disposition of embryos produced by IVF and addressed questions re-
garding the acceptability of freezing and performing research on em-
bryos. 15 3 A majority of the Waller Committee concluded that some
forms of embryo research should be allowed in order to improve the suc-
cess rate of IVF programs and to promote genetic research.15 4
A majority of the Waller Committee, however, also felt that forma-
tion of embryos solely for research or experimentation was not accepta-
ble and that such research should be limited to the excess embryos
produced by the gamete of patients in an IVF program. 155 The Waller
Committee stated that "the use of any embryo for research shall be im-
mediate, and in an approved and current project in which the embryo
shall not be allowed to develop beyond the stage of implantation, which
is completed 14 days after fertilization."'' 56
In response to great public concern about research on human em-
bryos, the Waller Committee recommended the formation of a review
and advisory body to control and supervise all such research.' 57 This
body would be empowered to examine and report on all matters related
to fertility and reproduction. 58 The Waller Committee recommended
that either this body or the Victorian Health Commission regularly scru-
tinize all human embryo research. 59
The Victorian government recently passed two pieces of legislation
largely implementing the Waller Committee's major recommenda-
tions. 160 In response to the recommendation for a review body, the Infer-
tility (Medical Procedures) Bill provides for the establishment of the
Standing Review and Advisory Committee, which will have the power to
authorize proposed experimental procedures.' 6 ' The second piece of leg-
islation is the Status of the Children (Amendment) Act, which resolves
the problems of status of children born as a result of the use of donated
genetic material. 62
152. WALLER COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
153. Id. at 24-28.
154. Id. at 45.
155. Id. at 46.
156. Id. at 47.
157. Id. at 48.
158. Id. at 56-57.
159. Id. at 48.
160. The Status of the Children (Amendment) Act 1984, and the Infertility (Medical Pro-
cedures) Bill 1984 (passed but not yet proclaimed, at which time it will become operative); see
Corns, Legal Regulation of In Vitro Fertilization in Victoria, 58 LAW INST. J. 838 (1984);
Skene, supra note 2, at 390.
161. Skene, supra note 2, at 390.
162. The Status of the Children (Amendment) Act 1984; see also Corns, supra note 160, at
838.
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In 1982, as a response to the issues raised by in vitro births,163 the
Australian Federal Department of Health, through the National Health
and Medical Research Council ("NH and MRC"), also published guide-
lines in a Statement on Human Experimentation and Supplementary
Notes.164 The proposed guidelines begin by justifying research with fer-
tilized ova as inseparable from the development of safe and effective IVF
and embryo transfer. As part of the IVF research, the NH and MRC
acknowledge that other important scientific information concerning
human reproductive biology may emerge. The NH and MRC cautioned,
however, that any continuation of embryonic development in vitro be-
yond the stage at which implantation would normally occur is not ac-
ceptable. 165 This stage is generally considered to occur fourteen days
after fertilization. 166
United Kingdom
Two committees in the United Kingdom have issued important
statements regarding research on embryos. The Medical Research Coun-
cil of Great Britain (MRC) and, more recently, the officially appointed
United Kingdom Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and
Embryology, commonly known as the Warnock Committee, have devel-
oped recommendations pertaining to research on embryos.
In 1984, the sixteen-member Warnock Committee published its rec-
ommendations in response to growing public concern and awareness of
the issues surrounding IVF. 167 Their report was more liberal than either
of the Australian proposals. A majority of the Warnock Committee rec-
ommended enactment of legislation permitting research on any embryo
resulting from IVF, whatever its source, up through the fourteenth day
after fertilization. 168
The Warnock Committee, subject to strong dissent by some com-
mittee members,169 felt it acceptable to create embryos specifically for
research purposes. They cautioned, though, that embryos used for re-
search should not be transferred to a woman for further development.
The fourteen-day limitation was chosen because the Warnock Committee
viewed this as the period before individual development and the forma-
163. Skene, supra note 2, at 385.
164. National Health and Medical Research Council, Report of the Eighty-Second Session,
as cited in WALLER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 40-43 [hereinafter cited as NH
and MRC Report].
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 17-20 & accompanying text.
167. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1984) [hereinafter cited as WAR-
NOCK COMMITTEE REPORT].
168. Id. at 66.
169. Id. at 87-93.
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tion of the primitive streak. 7
0
In addition, the Warnock Committee recommended the formation
of a statutory licensing authority. ' 7' This body would review all research
proposals and would strictly supervise all approved projects. Criminal
sanctions would be imposed for violation of the licensing authority's
standards. 172 The Warnock Committee recommended that the licensing
authority should not be dominated by scientists and specifically advised
that it should have a lay chairman. 73
The relevant MRC guidelines for research related to human fertili-
zation and embryology are as follows:
Scientifically sound research involving experiments on the.., products
of in vitro fertilization between human gametes is ethically acceptable
and should be allowed to proceed on condition . . . that there is no
intent to transfer to the uterus any embryo resulting from or used in
such experiments ....
Aproval [sic] for each experiment should be obtained from the
appropriate scientific and local ethical committees ....
When [embryos have been produced] for a therapeutic purpose
and are no longer required for that purpose it would be ethical to use
them for... research provided that the informed consent of both do-
nors [is] obtained ....
[Human embryos] should not be cultured in vitro beyond the im-
plantation stage; and should not be stored for unspecified research use
Studies on interspecies fertilization are valuable in providing in-
formation . . . . But the embryo should not be allowed to develop
beyond the early cleavage stage.174
Although the specific recommendations of the international state-
ments discussed above vary, the underlying theme of these statements
seems to indicate a desire for regulation of embryo research. While the
Australian and United Kingdom committees indicated that certain types
of research are beneficial and necessary for advancement of medical sci-
ence, none of these committees proposed giving unregulated freedom to
researchers.
The issues faced in the United Kingdom and Australia are identical
to the issues that arise in the embryo experimentation context in the
United States. Therefore, recommendations made by these foreign com-
mittees can provide us with valuable guidance in proposing our own
regulations.
170. Id. at 66; see also Brahams, supra note 5, at 239.
171. WARNOCK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 167, at 75.
172. Id. at 64; McLaren, supra note 20, at 305.
173. WARNOCK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 167, at 75-76.
174. WALLER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 41-43 (emphasis added) (containing
a summary of the recommendations of several other committees).
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Proposed Guidelines Regulating Research on Spare Embryos in
the United States
Medical science has progressed to the point at which regulation of
research on spare embryos is appropriate. There is a growing tension
between the desire to improve the human condition through knowledge
gained by such innovative experimentation and the instinctive revulsion
shared by many toward this type of research. As one writer aptly com-
mented, "In the absence of legislation, anything is possible and will lu-
ridly be supposed to be taking place."' 175 The answer is neither to give
free reign to researchers, nor, at the other extreme, to impose a blanket
legal prohibition. "The knowledge is out. We cannot unknow it. We
must control it.' ' 176
This Note proposes implementation of a system providing for review
of embryo research projects and a number of guidelines for the enact-
ment of future state legislation. Although guidelines have been criticized
by some as "woolly statements lacking precision and clarity, [they] are
frequently the only means of commencing the journey towards future
legal regulation."'' 77 The individual states should be the primary regulat-
ing agencies of medical research on spare embryos, with a national advi-
sory board to set nonbinding guideline policies. Not only will this help
prevent the formation of a gulf between national and local considera-
tions, as has developed in the area of fetal research, 78 it will ensure that
the varied interests of the citizens of different states will be considered
prior to enacting legislation. Although broad-based federal regulation
would ensure uniformity, advisory guidance by a federal biomedical eth-
ics committee or an ethics advisory board would have a more satisfactory
effect. The outer limits on issues of great controversy would be set by
these boards, while still allowing the prevailing local views to determine
the specific parameters of acceptable experimentation in a given
community.
Appropriate state legislation should adhere to the following
guidelines:
Limited to Spare Embryos
Embryo research should be limited to the "spare embryos" pro-
175. Opinion, supra note 38, at 612.
176. Scott, Bioethics: Experimental Medicine, N.Z.L.J., July 1984, at 228, 230.
177. Scott, supra note 2, at 414.
178. Fletcher & Shulman, Fetal Research: The State of the Question, HASTINGS CENTER.
REP., Apr. 1985, at 6, 11. (Support for federal research is divided; research involving more risk
to the mother or fetus is largely supported through private funding, while safe research that
poses less or no risk to the mother or fetus is supported by federal sources.).
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duced in the course of in vitro fertilization. 179 Society is divided in its
views of the moral status of the embryo, according it varying levels of
respect. Compromise is essential. Allowing already produced spare em-
bryos to be used as the subject of research projects would enable the
continued advances in medical science that many feel are critical. 180
However, prohibiting the creation of embryos solely for research would
eliminate some of the ethical and moral objections 8" by taking into ac-
count both the special status many people accord the embryo and the
potentially great benefits of research. Because of the sensitive nature of
this problem, whatever the ultimate disposition, some segment of society
will be dissatisfied.
Fourteen-day Developmental Limit
The unimplanted embryo should not be allowed to develop beyond
fourteen days after fertilization. 182 At this stage the germ layers, includ-
ing the primitive streak, form, 83 and the cells begin to differentiate into
various tissues and organs, losing their "totipotency."'' 84 This is the very
last stage at which monozygotic twinning can take place and so marks
the initiation of the individual human development. 85 This is also the
point at which, under normal reproductive circumstances, the process of
implantation will be complete. 186 Research on spare embryos would be
limited by this restriction.
Donor Consent
When spare embryos are sought to be used as the subjects of a re-
179. This recommendation was made by the Waller Committee. See supra text accompa-
nying note 155.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 44-51.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 52-64.
182. This recommendation was made by the Waller Committee, the Warnock Committee,
the NH and MRC, and the MRC. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20, 156, 168, 170.
183. The germ layers consist of the ectoderm, the endoderm, and the mesoderm. The
entire nervous system, as well as the epidermis and other organs and tissues, develop from the
ectoderm. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 17, at 96. The primitive streak forms
on the surface of the ectoderm, J. LANGMAN, supra note 19, at 46, and is significant because of
the continuous migration of cells from the region of the primitive streak in a cephalic (head)
direction. Id. at 50. These ectodermal cells give rise to the neural plate, the precursor of the
central nervous system. Id. at 32, 56.
184. Prior to the 14-day period, the cells of the blastocyst are totipotent. "As yet none is
on its way to becoming ... blood, or has 'clicked off' its potency for becoming a liver cell or a
bone. At this point in... development the individual (like an earthworm) can renew itself even
if momentarily injured." Ramsey, Manufacturing Our Offspring: Weighing the Risks. 8 HAS-
TINGS CENTER. REP., Oct. 1978, at 7, 8.
185. J. LANGMAN, supra note 19, at 98. Monozygotic twinning is when one fertilized
oocyte forms two primitive streaks and develops into two individual fetuses, commonly known
as identical twins. McLaren, supra note 20, at 305.
186. See supra notes 17-20 & accompanying text.
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search project, consent of the donors should be required. The donors
should have the sole authority to decide the disposition of their concepti.
Such consent would satisfy the property interest of the donors in the
embryos. 187 It also would help protect any moral beliefs regarding em-
bryo status that the donors might hold. If, for example, certain donors
believe that the embryo is a "person" from the moment of conception,
they may refuse to permit their concepti to be used for research, and
instead choose to donate to an infertile woman or couple. Because the
status of the embryo is neither a scientifically verifiable notion nor legally
defined, 188 it is a question for the individual donor to decide. This con-
sent requirement is consistent with the respect for the individual that
characterizes our society.
Current Specified Projects
The spare embryo should only be used in a current research pro-
ject,189 approved by the interdisciplinary review boards discussed be-
low.190 Allowing spare embryos to be frozen for unspecified future use
would make the experiments more difficult to monitor and would en-
courage abuse of these guidelines. If an immediate use for every embryo
donated was not specified, the temptation would exist to allow the em-
bryo to develop past the acceptable limit or to use it as the subject of an
unapproved project. While it would be practical for the review boards to
monitor approved projects, it would be quite impracticable to expect
them to monitor each donated embryo. This recommendation does not
preclude the freezing of embryos when freezing is part of an ongoing
research project, which for example, is testing the effects of freezing on
embryo chromosome structure.
No Subsequent Uterine Transfer
No embryo that has been the subject of a research project should be
transferred subsequently to a uterus for further development or experi-
mentation. Allowing transfer of an embryo previously used for experi-.
mentation could encourage abuse. For example, it could lead to
experiments in genetic manipulation and eugenic selection.191 It is also
possible that we would see an increase in the number of embryos brought
to term that suffer from some type of congenital abnormality caused by
187. This recommendation was made by the American Fertility Society. See supra notes
102-10 & accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 70-100 & accompanying text.
189. This recommendation was made by the Waller Committee, See supra text accompa-
nying note 156. The MRC recommended that the embryos not be stored for unspecified future
use. WALLER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 42.
190. See infra notes 193-95 & accompanying text.
191. Eugenics is the study of hereditary improvement, particularly human improvement,
through genetic control.
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the research. At this very early stage in medical research, the risks are
simply too great to allow subsequent transfer and development of an em-
bryo that has been the subject of an experimental procedure.
No Interspecies Experimentation
Interspecies fertilization involving one human gamete is generally
considered to be ethically unacceptable and should not be allowed. 192
Although all research arguably can benefit mankind in some fashion, the
more highly controversial types of experimentation should require
greater justification before being approved. Interspecies fertilization
would likely be even more controversial than other types of experimenta-
tion, conjuring up morally repugnant images of chimeras and Nazi war
crimes.
The dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable research on
human embryos, although wavering, should be drawn before allowing
interspecies fertilization. At this time, the benefits that would inure to
this type of experimentation are far outweighed by the need to set limits
that will satisfy the majority of our society.
Locally Established Review Boards
The proposed guidelines for legislation are necessarily relatively
broad. Because medical science is advancing so rapidly, it would be im-
possible to draft detailed legislation that would govern every eventuality.
A more practical solution than comprehensive legislation would be a sys-
tem of locally established review boards that would review and approve
projects on an ad hoc basis.1 93 The boards would be similar in function
to the federally mandated Institutional Review Boards. 194 The review
boards should be interdisciplinary, made up of a cross-section of the in-
terested community. They should include, but not be limited to, physi-
cians, researchers, attorneys, legislators, theologians, and ethicists who
would represent the prevailing local attitudes and concerns.
Each institution involved in human embryo research should set up a
review board that would keep abreast of the current developments in bi-
omedical science. The primary function of the board would be to screen
human embryo research proposals. Every proposal should receive indi-
vidual consideration. The probable merits of the research should be
weighed with the ethical issues implicated before the board determines
192. The Waller Committee did not address the issue of interspecies experimentation. See
WALLER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 58-61 (summary of recommendations). The
English MRC recommended that interspecies fertilization be allowed up to the early cleavage
stage. See supra text accompanying note 174.
193. Several recommendations for some type of reviewing body have been made. See
supra text accompanying notes 157-61, 171-73.
194. See supra note 116 & accompanying text.
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whether to approve the proposal. Once approved, the review board
should monitor the progress of the project. Locally established boards
would be able to keep experimentation within limits acceptable to the
particular community.
National Advisory Board
For policy guidance in particularly controversial cases, the local re-
view boards should be able to look to a national advisory body. This
function could be filled by one of two already existing bodies: either by
one of the two Ethics Advisory Boards (EAB) mandated by the Commis-
sion for the Protection of Human Subjects 195 or the new Biomedical Eth-
ics Committee mandated by Congress. 196
One of the functions of the EAB is to review research proposals
requesting federal funding to ensure that they meet ethical standards ac-
ceptable to the general community. 197 Thus, the EAB would be an ap-
propriate body for providing guidance to the local boards in resolving
difficult issues.
The Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee also would provide
suitable guidance for local review boards. The duties of the Committee
are to "study and report ... on a continuing basis on the ethical issues
arising from.., biomedical and behavioral research .... -"198 With the
state of medical research on spare embryos currently advancing rapidly,
one or both of these bodies should consider the relevant and changing
ethical considerations as they arise. The local review boards can use
their findings and recommendations as nonbinding advisory policy.
In order to allow biomedical science to develop in a controlled fash-
ion, some degree of regulation is necessary. Local review boards that
represent diverse community interests should review all human embryo
proposals. They should have leeway to operate within broad state legis-
lation and should look to one of the two national ethics committees for
guidance on particularly controversial issues.
Conclusion
Any use of the spare embryo is likely to stir up controversy. The
conflict between the desire to gain knowledge by one segment of the com-
munity and the shock and horror felt by others at some of the sugges-
tions for embryo research indicates a growing need for legislative
regulation.
Clear guidelines should be established, confining research to those
195. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204 (1985); see supra notes 117-18 & accompanying text.
196. Health Research Extension Act of 1985, § 11, Pub. L. No. 99-158, 99 Stat. 820, 884.
197. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526 (1975).
198. Health Research Extension Act of 1985, § 11, Pub. L. No. 99-158, 99 Stat. 820, 883.
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areas that society considers acceptable. It will be many years, possibly
generations, before science, theology, and ethics can come together and
determine when "life begins." But until that time, science should not
have free reign to conduct research on spare embryos.
Statutorily mandated state review boards would provide an accepta-
ble check on experimentation, setting policy consistent with the proposed
state legislation as developments warrant. The interdisciplinary boards
would represent all of the various interested groups and, through discus-
sion and compromise, would presumably satisfy a large part of the
community.
This proposal attempts to accommodate both the interests of society
and the interests of the scientific community. It adopts a position be-
tween the extremes of prohibiting all research on embryos and one al-
lowing production of embryos specifically for research. This proposal
also takes into consideration the potential advantages of research to soci-
ety by allowing certain types of research, while at the same time prohibit-
ing the most controversial types.
The time for regulation is upon us. Otherwise research will begin at
a widely acceptable point and small steps will be introduced,
each one justified because it differs only slightly from the one that pre-
ceded it and yet yields a new benefit or advance in understanding. The
expanded programme achieved at the end is one that would never have
been approved at the beginning, but eventually, when it is arrived at, it
is too late to change or restrict. 199
Barbara Gregoratos*
199. France, supra note 26, at 236.
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